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AN “OFFICER” AND A G[OLD]MAN: THE THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS
AMBIGUOUS CORPORATE TITLES JEOPARDIZE RIGHT TO
ADVANCEMENT UNDER DELAWARE LAW IN ALEYNIKOV v.
GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC.
CARINA M. MELECA*
“[B]eing able to choose which of its officers will receive advance pay-
ments for legal bills gives the firm significant leverage over those who
become ensnared in an investigation or lawsuit.  Indeed, the flexible na-
ture of Goldman’s policy could easily discourage those involved in such
proceedings from implicating superiors who may have been involved in
wrongdoing.  Who would take such a chance, knowing that Goldman
could cut off the legal fee spigot at any time?”1
I. INTRODUCTION
At the turn of the twenty-first century, white-collar crime permeated
the corporate sector in an unprecedented way.2  The Enron, Adelphia,
and Worldcom financial scandals forced courts, regulators, and legislators
to reexamine their once passive role in dictating accountability for corpo-
rate officers.3  In the wake of these scandals and their reactionary influ-
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012, Lehigh
University.  I would like to thank my family and friends, especially my parents,
Michael and Vildan, who have given me every opportunity to succeed in life and
without whose love and support I would not be where I am today.  Additionally,
thank you to Kelsey Hughes-Blaum and Mark Wilhelm for their thoughtful edits to
many drafts of this Casebrief (and for fielding an incessant amount of questions at
each phase).  Lastly, I would be remiss to not thank Nicole Pedi, Tommy Reilly,
and D.J. Shauger for their mentorship, insight, and advice throughout the entire
year this Casebrief was being written.
1. Gretchen Morgenson, At Goldman Sachs, Even the Legal Fees Are Different, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/business/at-goldman-
sachs-even-the-legal-fees-are-different.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/L7XG-AKCH].
2. See generally JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. COR-
PORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM (2006) (providing background of cor-
porate scandals during the early 2000s).
3. See, e.g., Accountability Issues: Lessons Learned from Enron’s Fall: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Hon. Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107shrg84416/pdf/CHRG-107shrg84416.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6R9A-4BG3?type=source] (noting “the courts,” among others, did not
protect public from Enron scandal and urging committee to ensure this type of
“corporate ruse” never happens again); Alton B. Harris & Andrea S. Kramer, Corpo-
rate Governance: Pre-Enron, Post-Enron, in CORPORATE AFTERSHOCK: THE PUBLIC POL-
ICY LESSONS FROM THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON AND OTHER MAJOR CORPORATIONS 49,
49–78  (Christopher L. Culp & William A. Niskanen eds., 2003) (examining how
“corporate governance”—“the process by which a corporation’s management is
held accountable to its residual owners”—has changed since Enron and similar
(781)
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ence on the corporate climate, maintaining the “officer” title has never
been riskier for the individual or more necessary for the success of the
market.4  On one hand, post-Enron officers subject themselves to new re-
alities such as intensified public scrutiny, increasingly litigious stockhold-
ers, and the economic unpredictability embedded in managing a business
still in recovery from the Great Recession.5  On the other hand, the recent
financial crises have heightened the need for competent executives to
steer corporations out of the red.6  Accordingly, for most officers, assur-
ance of impunity from personal liability has become necessary to effectu-
ate corporate service.7  As courts and legislatures attempt to
counterbalance these “carrots and sticks” inherent in corporate leader-
ship, indemnification and advancement of legal fees are increasingly rec-
ognized as important sources of legal protection.8
financial scandals).  One major piece of federal legislation enacted since these
scandals was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See id. at 49, 71.  The Act was the first
regulation to address corporate accountability in federal legislation for over sixty-
five years. See id. at 71.
4. See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS
AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 441 (7th ed. 2014) (com-
paring risks of maintaining corporate title—attorney’s fees and frivolous suits, liti-
gation costs, civil damages, and criminal fines—with legal protections traditionally
afforded by corporate planners such as exculpatory statutes, demand rules, disin-
terested litigation committees, indemnification, and insurance); Martin Petrin, Cir-
cumscribing the “Prosecutor’s Ticket to Tag the Elite”—A Critique of the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 290–92, 304–06 (2012) (explaining
heightened liability risks for corporate officers, including strict liability standards,
civil sanctions, criminal charges, and hefty monetary fines for “responsible corpo-
rate officers”).
5. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Foreword to E. NORMAN VEASEY & CHRISTINE T. DI
GUGLIELMO, INDISPENSABLE COUNSEL: THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER IN THE NEW REAL-
ITY, xv, xv–xvi (2012) (“[T]rust among shareholders, creditors, employees, re-
cruits, customers, suppliers, regulators, communities, the media, and the general
public [has decreased]. . . .  This trust . . . has dramatically eroded [over the past
decade] due to stark corporate scandals and unthinkable business failures.”).
Even after the early financial scandals of the twenty-first century, some still argue
that high-level corporate officers and directors do not, in actuality, expose them-
selves to much liability. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Despite Worries, Serving at the
Top Carries Little Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/06/07/despite-worries-serving-at-the-top-carries-little-risk/?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/HCJ3-Z9Z2] (arguing risks of liability to officers and directors are still
not as high as post-financial crisis regulatory reforms would suggest).
6. See Heineman, supra note 5, at xvii (emphasizing need for strong corporate
citizenship from CEOs, which entails “making and selling great goods and services
the right way and, in doing so, serving local, regional, national, and global commu-
nities in order to engender the crucial trust that is so necessary to sustained eco-
nomic growth, brand power, and strong reputation with both internal and
external constituencies”).
7. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing policies underly-
ing advancement).
8. See infra notes 30–51 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of in-
demnification and advancement legal fees within Delaware).
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Indemnification and advancement insulate officers from personal lia-
bility when they are sued in their capacity as an officer, either by way of
reimbursing the individual for losses incurred after litigation or by floating
the costs of proceedings as the litigation progresses.9  As the state of incor-
poration for more than half of Fortune 500 companies, it is unsurprising
that Delaware law is often in the crosshairs of indemnification and ad-
vancement litigation.10  And even Delaware, a jurisdiction historically re-
luctant to interfere with the gravamens of corporate management, has not
been immune to criticism surrounding indemnification and advancement
statutes, particularly since 2008.11  The very idea that a corporation—or
rather, its stockholders—would foot the legal bill when an officer is ac-
cused of criminal behavior is counterintuitive to most laypeople.12  Per-
9. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) (defining
advancement as “provid[ing] corporate officials with immediate interim relief
from the personal out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-go-
ing expenses inevitably involved with investigations and legal proceedings.”); see
also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 886 (10th ed. 2014) (defining act of indemnification
as “[t]he action of compensating for loss or damage sustained[ ]”); infra notes
34–45 and accompanying text (discussing differences between advancement and
indemnification generally); infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing
indemnification and advancement in specific context of Delaware’s statutory
code).
10. See LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., DEL. DEP’T OF STATE DIV. OF CORPS., WHY CORPORA-
TIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), available at http://corp.delaware.gov/
whycorporations_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/YH9X-HGYR] (noting “more than
one-half [of Fortune 500 companies] are incorporated in Delaware”).  The pres-
tige of Delaware’s Court of Chancery also attracts companies to incorporate there.
Id. at 5–7.
11. See, e.g., Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Deriva-
tive Litigation: The Delaware Courts’ Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L.
REV. 589, 625 (2008) (criticizing Delaware’s response to corporate scandals in part
because indemnification agreements require corporations to pay incurred legal
expenses).  For examples of Delaware cases highlighting the importance of corpo-
rate indemnification and advancement in 2008 alone, see Barrett v. Am. Country
Holdings, Inc., 951 A.2d 735 (Del. Ch. 2008); Jackson Walker LLP. v. Spira Foot-
wear, Inc., No. 3150-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82 (Del. Ch. June 23, 2008); Rein-
hard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008); Sassano v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp., 948 A.2d 453 (Del. Ch.
2008); Schoon v. Troy Corp., 948 A.2d 1157 (Del. Ch. 2008); Sodano v. Am. Stock
Exch. LLC, No. 3418-VCS, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 92 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2008), aff’d
sub nom. 970 A.2d 256 (Del. 2009); Sun-Times Media Grp., Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d
380 (Del. Ch. 2008).
12. See Matt Levine, Goldman Sachs Just Says ‘Vice President’ to Be Polite, BLOOM-
BERG VIEW (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-09-04/
goldman-sachs-just-says-vice-president-to-be-polite [http://perma.cc/M4YH-4FDV]
(“Indemnification is always a weird thing, and it is not intuitive to most people that
a bank should have to pay the legal bills for people accused of committing crimes
against that bank.”); see also Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1078
(1968) (providing depiction of apprehension surrounding indemnification and
advancement nearly fifty years ago that is still present today).
A vast pother has arisen in corporate circles over the dreadful plight of
officers and directors, beset on the one hand by predatory strike suitors
anxious to convert them and their little families into welfare clients if
3
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haps even more counterintuitive is the idea that lawmakers would
mandate this sort of protection.13
Nevertheless, with litigation costs often accruing to millions, indemni-
fication and advancement provisions are vital to a properly functioning
corporate America.14  Post-Enron corporations must now reconcile how to
accept responsibility for their actors without subjecting themselves to
costly and undue litigation expenses.15  This was the conundrum at the
core of a recent Third Circuit case, Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc.,16 involving a major corporate player in the banking world and one of
its officers—or, as the defense argued, one of its non-officers.17
In an attempt to evade advancing legal fees for one of its vice presi-
dents, Goldman Sachs argued that “vice presidents” are not “officers,”
their titles are “not particularly meaningful,” and the “VP” designation is
largely a result of title inflation, rather than a denotation of actual author-
their efforts to maximize the corporation’s profits come to grief, beset on
the other by ruthless minions of the Antitrust Division determined to
throw them into the federal pen if those efforts succeed.  Some, perhaps
most, of the excitement has been generated by the aggressive and imagi-
native propaganda of underwriters pushing insurance against such
hazards.
Id.; id. at 1079 (“The most brazen of these older by-laws purported to permit exec-
utives adjudged guilty of breaching their duty to the corporation to be indemni-
fied not only for their counsel fees but also for the very sums they had been
ordered to pay the corporation.”).
13. See Stephen A. Radin, “Sinners Who Find Religion”: Advancement of Litigation
Expenses to Corporate Officials Accused of Wrongdoing, 25 REV. LITIG. 251, 263–68
(2006) (analyzing unexpected consequences of mandatory advancement statutes);
Morgenson, supra note 1 (providing statement of Goldman Sachs spokesperson on
recent appeal regarding indemnification matter who stated, “Our employees
shouldn’t expect the firm to pay for their defense when they steal from us.” (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
14. See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR





93,d.cWw (cataloging key findings of litigation cost survey for Fortune 200 compa-
nies).  The survey reports that between 2000 and 2008, outside litigation costs per
respondent increased 73% from $66 million to $115 million (9% increase per
year). Id. at 2.  The average annual litigation costs for the same companies as a
percentage of their revenues increased 78% over the same time period. Id. at 3.
15. See Pamela D. Pengelley, Indemnity and Infidelity: Advancement of Defence
Costs in Actions “By . . . the Corporation”, 48 CAN. BUS. L.J. 389, 390 (2009) (“The
principle of indemnification strikes a delicate balance between seeking the middle
ground between encouraging fiduciaries to violate their trust, and discouraging
them from serving at all.” (quoting Joseph F. Johnston, Jr., Corporate Indemnification
and Liability Insurance for Directors and Officers, 33 BUS. LAW 1993, 1994 (1978)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
16. 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
17. See infra notes 83–109 and accompanying text (discussing facts, proce-
dure, holding, and analysis of Aleynikov case).
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ity or responsibility.18  The case has become high profile, in part because
the defendant’s argument—the one that ultimately persuaded the
court—allows corporations to dispel responsibility for literally thousands
of employees through post hoc contract interpretation.19  Regardless of the
inordinate amount of attention the case has received, the Third Circuit’s
decision is widely applicable—and problematic—to any company with by-
laws and any employees who function as officers (or at least think they
do).20
On its face, Aleynikov addresses a basic question: in what circum-
stances do which corporate actors receive the rights of advanced legal
fees?21  In a narrow sense, the court’s holding cautions corporate practi-
tioners to reexamine the clarity of their clients’ bylaws and to encourage
investment in liability insurance to protect individuals in high managerial
positions.22  More broadly, however, the Aleynikov holding gives preceden-
tial leeway for companies who benefit from employees with “inflated” VP
titles to do so without culpability for their actions.23
This Casebrief discusses the evolution of advancement rights for cor-
porate executives, focusing particularly on post-Enron developments for
Delaware corporations.24  Part II examines the competing statutes, case
law, and policies pertinent to the Aleynikov decision.25  Part III focuses on
18. See infra notes 96–109 and accompanying text (discussing Aleynikov narra-
tive analysis).
19. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 370 (Fuentes, J., dissenting in part) (“[T]oday’s
ruling encourages Goldman to . . . keep [ ] ambiguous language in place, thereby
giving many persons the reasonable expectations they will receive advancement,
while reserving the right to make unpredictable post hoc determinations about
which former employees should be advanced attorney’s fees and which
shouldn’t.”); Levine, supra note 12 (observing that keeping ambiguous corporate
bylaws helps “attract worker bees without having them worry too much about legal
risk” so that corporations will not have to “explicitly promise to thousands of em-
ployees that it will help keep them out of jail”); Morgenson, supra note 1 (criticiz-
ing Goldman for “ha[ving] more leeway to pick and choose which executives’ legal
bills it will pay if they become entangled in an investigation or legal proceeding”).
For a brief overview of the factual underpinnings that propelled Aleynikov’s
case into the spotlight, see Michael Lewis, Did Goldman Sachs Overstep in Criminally
Charging Its Ex-Programmer?, VANITY FAIR (Sept. 2013), http://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2013/09/michael-lewis-goldman-sachs-programmer [http://perma.cc/
4MXK-EQ5F].  For a lengthier narrative of the factual underpinnings of the case
and its relation to high-frequency trading models, see MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS:
A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
20. See infra notes 171–92 and accompanying text (discussing practical
problems posed by Aleynikov decision and recommendations for practitioners).
21. See infra notes 83–95 and accompanying text (discussing Aleynikov back-
ground facts).
22. See infra notes 110–69 and accompanying text (discussing critical analysis
and impact of Aleynikov).
23. See id.; see also infra notes 171–92 (positing macro-level implications of
Aleynikov decision).
24. See infra notes 34–199 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 34–78 and accompanying text.
5
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Aleynikov in its entirety, addresses the facts and procedure of Aleynikov, and
then details the Third Circuit’s rationale for its holding.26  Part IV exam-
ines the questionable preclusion of the contra proferentem doctrine in con-
sideration of Delaware precedent and policy and further juxtaposes the
Third Circuit and Delaware’s interpretive models for corporate contract
issues.27  In light of the Aleynikov holding, Part V provides practical advice
for corporate practitioners seeking to avoid similar advancement issues.28
Finally, Part VI concludes by positing the long-term implications of the
Third Circuit’s decision.29
II. BACKGROUND: AN OFFER OF DELAWARE’S VARIOUS FRAMEWORKS FOR
ANALYZING ADVANCEMENT ISSUES
Advancement is a complex issue governed by a variety of
frameworks.30  Situated within Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence, the
frameworks provide a succinct overview of overlapping, and sometimes
competing, legal theories for practitioners litigating advancement issues.31
These legal theories are mainly rooted in statute, contract doctrine, and
state public policy.32  Depending on whether the reviewing court consid-
ers the frameworks piecemeal or comprehensively, understanding the ele-
ments of each scheme is crucial to successfully litigating an advancement
claim.33
A. The Groundwork: Defining Advancement and Indemnification
When an officer is sued or charged in a claim related to their corpo-
rate service, indemnification and advancement act as complementary pro-
tections triggered at different points in the defense.34  For officers
defending against a litany of lawsuits, this distinction is critical.  Indemnifi-
cation is a remedy afforded after the proceeding has been resolved in the
defendant’s favor “on the merits or otherwise.”35  But the definitive end to
any given proceeding could take months, even years, and litigation costs
and attorney’s fees often aggregate astronomically during that time.36
26. See infra notes 79–109 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 110–69 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 171–92 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 194–99 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 34–78 and accompanying text.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; see also infra notes 171–92 and accompanying text (discussing litiga-
tion strategies for corporate practitioners following Aleynikov).
34. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) (“Advancement
is an especially important corollary to indemnification . . . .”).
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Sun-Times Media Grp., Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 385 (Del. Ch.
2008) (noting company had advanced over $77 million to its former officers over
span of five years); see also Andrew M. Johnston et al., Recent Delaware Law Develop-
ments in Advancement and Indemnification: An Analytical Guide, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 7 30-NOV-15 15:52
2015] CASEBRIEF 787
Advancement is the corollary protection that mitigates these costs by
providing “immediate interim relief from the personal-out-of-pocket finan-
cial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved
with investigations and legal proceedings.”37  Advancement does not con-
sider the merits of a case at the outset, but rather focuses on whether there
is a “pendency” of claims against a corporate executive.38  Advanced fees
are also conditioned on a successful judgment; defendants who receive
advanced fees and ultimately lose their case must repay the funds back to
the corporation.39
The “prepayment” latitude of advancement should theoretically insu-
late an officer from expenses incurred until liability is determined, at
which point they are then either required to repay the fees or they be-
come eligible for indemnification.40  When a corporate defendant’s right
to advancement has been challenged, however, the individual risks insol-
vency and, perhaps more unjustly, mootness.41  Advanced fees are only
81, 83 (2009) (citing Sun-Times Media Group, Inc., 2008 Annual Report (Form 10-
K), 99 (Apr. 14, 2009)) (noting total advancement costs eventually amounted to
$119 million for Sun-Times); id. (“The U.S. Attorney . . . cited several examples of
the litigation expenses incurred in recent high-profile trials—$70 million for the
defense of Jeffrey Skilling in the Enron case; $25 million for the defense of the
Rigases in the Adelphia case; $21 million for the defense of Richard Scrushy in the
HealthSouth case; and $26 million for the defense of Dennis Kozlowski in two
Tyco trials.”); LITIGATION COSTS OF MAJOR COMPANIES, supra note 14, (providing
corporate litigation costs).
37. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211; see also Regina Robson, Paying for Daniel Webster:
Critiquing the Contract Model of Advancement of Legal Fees in Criminal Proceedings, 7
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 277 (2011) (“Advancement of legal fees and other costs of
litigation is a modern day corollary to the right to indemnification.”); supra note
34 (citing Homestore’s use of “corollary” as description for advancement rights).
38. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *14 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013) (“Advancement, by contrast,
depends on the pendency, not the merits, of the claims asserted against the corpo-
rate official.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
39. See id. at *27 (noting that advancement statute and bylaws “reserv[e] the
company’s right to repayment once litigation has ended”); id. at *28–29 (“[T]he
advancement remedy . . . . is provisional to the extent that a person who receives
advancement of fees must furnish an ‘undertaking’ to pay them back if he or she is
unsuccessful in the underlying litigation.”); Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829
A.2d 178, 182–83 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[A]dvancement can be thought of as an exten-
sion of credit, the final repayment of which is conditioned on whether a corporate
official is ultimately entitled to indemnification.”).
40. See Robson, supra note 37, at 277 (explaining that advancement is interim
form of relief for individuals who may be eligible for indemnification); id. at 278
(describing advancement as “prepayment”).
41. See Aleynikov, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *29 (explaining temporal
considerations for advancement).  The court noted that “advancement, if not ex-
peditious, may be valueless.” See id.; see also United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d
230, 270, 272–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining mootness point). See also supra notes
14, 36 and accompanying text (providing cost of litigation).
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effective so long as they are made in tandem with the litigation generating
the expense.42
Procedural delays may obviate any potential benefit of the advance-
ment remedy entirely.43  Typically, a corporation will appeal a judgment
that it must advance fees.44  This appeals process may result in the fee-
producing litigation “lapping” the advancement litigation, in turn render-
ing the advancement issue moot and the corporate official without
relief.45
B. The Statutory Scheme and Section 145 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law
In 1943, as Delaware’s corporate jurisprudence began to depart from
principles of agency law, the legislature mandated that corporations in-
demnify officers who have successfully defended themselves against litiga-
tion related to their official capacities.46  However, Section 145 of the
42. See United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 272–73 (describing underly-
ing principle of advancement) motion to strike granted by 452 F. Supp. 2d 276
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
If a right to advancement of defense costs exists, the inherent nature of
the right is to receive the funds as the defense costs are incurred.  Post-
ponement of determination whether such a right exists would render the
right meaningless.  By the time a decision were reached, the underlying
proceeding would be over—the occasion for advancing defense costs
would have passed and its purpose would have been defeated.
Id.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1995) (appealing
advancement claim because of officer’s alleged fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty); Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Reddy, 820 A.2d 371 (Del. 2003) (appealing ad-
vancement claims because of officer’s alleged negligence and fraud) (mem.); Cita-
del Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818 (Del. 1992) (appealing advancement
claims because officer illegally engaged in trading stock).
45. See Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d. at 273 (noting consequences of procedural
delays).
In consequence, determination of a claim for advancement cannot wait
until the underlying case is over, when an employee’s right to indemnifi-
cation may be determined. Nor can it wait until an employer decides
whether to pursue any independent claims that it may have against the
employee or, if it has brought such claims, until the employer’s claims are
determined.
Id.
46. See VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (noting Dela-
ware enacted its indemnification statute in 1943); id. at 84 n.22 (citing first indem-
nification statute as Del. Laws 125 (1943), codified at 8 DEL. C. § 122(10)).  The
case that prompted legislatures to enact indemnification statutes was New York
Dock Co. v. McCollum, 16 N.Y.S. 2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).  James F. McKeown,
Comment, Corporate Indemnification of Directors and Officers—The Expanding Scope of
the Statutes, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 195, 197 (1969) (explaining that McCollum “trig-
gered a legislative reaction”).  In McCollum, the court denied directors reimburse-
ment after they had successfully defended themselves against a shareholder suit.
See id.  The statutory response to McCollum differs from Delaware’s original sources
of agency law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: DUTY OF INDEMNITY; § 438
8
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Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) limits mandatory indemnifi-
cation to instances where the officer “acted in good faith and in a manner
the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best inter-
ests of the corporation.”47
In contrast, Section 145(e) does not require corporations to advance
legal fees in any circumstance, but merely empowers them to do so at their
discretion.48  Consequently, advancement provisions are largely byprod-
(1958).  In agency law, and consequently in the early common law cases on indem-
nification, a principal was only required to indemnify his or her agent if the agent
was acting as authorized or directed by the principal. See id.  By contrast, Section
145 is triggered in much more attenuated circumstances: “[B]y reason of the fact
that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation,
or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or
agent of another corporation . . . .” See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (2015)
(emphasis added).  For a further discussion of the evolution of indemnification at
common law, see Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Current Status of Corporate Directors’ Right to
Indemnification, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1068–69 (1956).
47. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(c) (2015) (providing default and
mandatory rules for indemnification).
(a) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person . . . by
reason of the fact that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent
of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a
director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation . . . against expenses
(including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settle-
ment actually and reasonably incurred by the person in connection with
such action, suit or proceeding if the person acted in good faith and in a
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation . . . .
(b) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was
or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pend-
ing or completed action or suit by or in the right of the corporation to
procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that the person is or
was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee
or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other
enterprise against expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and rea-
sonably incurred by the person in connection with the defense or settle-
ment of such action or suit if the person acted in good faith and in a manner
the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best inter-
ests of the corporation . . . .
(c) To the extent that a present or former director or officer of a
corporation has been successful on the merits or otherwise in defense of
any action, suit or proceeding referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of
this section, or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, such per-
son shall be indemnified against expenses (including attorneys’ fees) ac-
tually and reasonably incurred by such person in connection therewith.
Id. (emphasis added).
48. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (providing default, permissive rule for
advancement).
(e) Expenses (including attorneys’ fees) incurred by an officer or
director of the corporation in defending any civil, criminal, administra-
tive or investigative action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corpora-
tion in advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or proceeding
upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of such director or officer
to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be determined that such per-
9
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ucts of the corporation’s bylaws and have little, if any, explicit substantive
statutory limits (or requirements).49  Section 145(k) does regulate the
procedure for advancement suits by vesting the Court of Chancery with
exclusive jurisdiction over advancement and indemnification issues
“brought under [Section 145] or under any bylaw, agreement.”50
C. The Contractual Framework: Letting Bylaws Be Bylaws
Though Section 145(e) empowers corporations to advance legal fees
for employees, the statute does not regulate the process or eligibility for
advancement.51  Instead, these provisions are typically drafted unilaterally,
embedded in the organization’s bylaws, and governed by contract doc-
trines.52  Bylaw disputes are thus construed in accordance with three basic
contract principles: (1) words will be given their plain meaning; (2) courts
will not resort to extrinsic evidence if the at-issue terms can be construed
unambiguously within the “four corners” of the document; and (3) in the
event unilaterally drafted bylaws contain ambiguous language, the ambigu-
ous term will be construed against the drafter—otherwise known as the
son is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation as authorized in
this section. Such expenses (including attorneys’ fees) incurred by for-
mer directors and officers or other employees and agents of the corpora-
tion or by persons serving at the request of the corporation as directors,
officers, employees or agents of another corporation, partnership, joint
venture, trust or other enterprise may be so paid upon such terms and condi-
tions, if any, as the corporation deems appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111, 113 (Del. 2001)
(determining mandatory advancement issue based on interpretation of corpora-
tion’s bylaws); Centaur Partners, IV v. Nat’l Intergroup, Inc., 582 A.2d 923, 928
(Del. 1990) (same); see also Robson, supra note 37, at 284 (“[F]or most employees
advancement is governed by bylaw provisions.  Such provisions frequently parrot
the language of the state statutes . . . .” (footnote omitted)); infra notes 52–73 and
accompanying text (discussing contractual principles governing bylaw provisions).
50. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (providing Chancery Court with exclu-
sive jurisdiction over bylaw matters):
The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and determine all actions for advancement of expenses or indemni-
fication brought under this section or under any bylaw, agreement, vote
of stockholders or disinterested directors, or otherwise.  The Court of
Chancery may summarily determine a corporation’s obligation to ad-
vance expenses (including attorneys’ fees).
Id.
51. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (discussing statutory
framework).
52. See Gentile, 788 A.2d at 113 (“[T]he rules used to interpret statutes, con-
tracts, and other written instruments are applicable when construing corporate
charters and bylaws.”); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 342–43
(Del. 1983) (same).  Bylaws are also uniquely situated in contract interpretation in
that even lack of consideration has not invalidated mandatory advancement under
Delaware law. See, e.g., Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982-VCP,
2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 65, at *36–37 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (indicating lack of
Delaware precedent invalidating corporate bylaw concerning mandatory advance-
ment for lack of consideration).
10
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doctrine of contra proferentem.53  Collectively, these principles protect both
the corporation and its employees by ensuring bylaws will be executed pre-
dictably, fairly, and reasonably, absent post hoc interpretation of their
terms.54
Under Delaware law, terms are ambiguous when they are “fairly sus-
ceptible of different interpretations or may have two or more different
meanings.”55  The “plain meaning” and “four corners” rules are simple,
mechanical approaches for resolving ambiguity.56  Under the plain mean-
ing doctrine, courts must analyze an ambiguous term in light of the term’s
“usual and ordinary” meaning.57  The four corners rule states that inter-
53. See Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Hayes, 106 A.3d 1029, 1033 (Del. 2013)
(“[T]he terms of a charter provision, like any other contract, are given their plain
meaning.”); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Del. Racing Ass’n, 840 A.2d 624, 630 (Del.
2003) (“[C]ontra preferentem [sic] [is the well-established] principle of construction,
which is that ambiguities in a contract should be construed against the drafter.”);
Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 824 (Del. 1992) (“When construing
a contract, and unless a contrary intent appears, we will give words their ordinary
meaning.”); cf. Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Commerzbank, 65 A.3d 539, 551 (Del. 2013)
(explaining that it is inappropriate to resort to extrinsic evidence about parties’
intent when evidence “would yield information about the views and positions of
only one side of the dispute” in situations involving unilateral drafting and no
negotiating).  In other cases interpreting Delaware law, the Third Circuit has also
found that extrinsic evidence relating exclusively to the intent of a unilaterally
drafting party was irrelevant to the resolution of ambiguity. See MBIA Ins. Corp. v.
Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 214 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) (“‘Undisputed background
facts’ do not include the self-serving parol evidence submitted by the parties,
whose recollections as to the intended meaning of the agreements predictably dif-
fer.”); see also infra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing “plain mean-
ing” and “four corners” rules).
54. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 370 (3d Cir.
2014) (Fuentes, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing rejection of contra proferentem be-
cause it fosters “unpredictable post hoc determinations”); Aleynikov v. Goldman
Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *44, *57
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013) (explaining that failed applications of plain meaning and
four corners rules lead to introduction of extrinsic evidence and criticizing
Goldman’s “post hoc characterization” gleaned from such evidence), aff’d in part
and vacated in part, 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
55. See Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381, 385 n.17 (Del.
2012) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co. v. Am. Motor Ins. Co., 616 A.2d
1192, 1196 (Del. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  There is a caveat to
this general definition: disagreement among the parties as to the meaning of a
term is not enough to show ambiguity. See Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding
Co., 802 A.2d 294, 309–10 (Del. Ch. 2002).  Instead, “[t]o demonstrate ambiguity,
a party must show that the instruments in question can be reasonably read to have
two or more meanings.” Id. at 309.
56. Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1596 (2005) (noting four corners rule generally limits judge’s
“interpretive role” and scope of interpretation); id. at 1597 (positing that four cor-
ners rule is not one of “interpretation” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
57. See Aleynikov, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *55 (equating plain mean-
ing with usual and ordinary meaning); Activision Blizzard, 106 A.3d at 1033 (ex-
plaining charter provision terms “are given their plain meaning”).  In the event
plain meaning is not readily apparent from the face of the contract, Delaware
courts may refer to the dictionary definition “for assistance in determining the
11
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pretation of ambiguous terms should be limited to the four corners of the
document; ambiguity should not be “judicially created” by inappropriately
introducing extrinsic evidence to the record.58  Delaware courts combine
these doctrines “to give effect to each term [in a contract] and to harmo-
nize seemingly conflicting terms.”59
Applications of the plain meaning and four corners doctrines may
ultimately prove fruitless, and courts may nevertheless be forced to con-
sider extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity.60  Unlike other rules for ju-
dicial interpretation, contra proferentem does not attempt to resolve the
ambiguity or force courts to “hunt” for clarity within extrinsic evidence.61
Instead, contra proferentem is a “last resort” rule grounded in equity rather
than substance.62 Contra proferentem is thus punitive in effect and prophy-
plain meaning . . . .” See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d
728, 738 (Del. 2006).  However, Delaware courts have introduced supplemental
canons of construction that reconcile ambiguity using “plain meaning” quite flexi-
bly. See, e.g., Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013)
(“A meaning inferred from a particular provision cannot control the agreement if
that inference conflicts with the agreement’s overall scheme.”); CA, Inc. v. Ingres
Corp., No. 4300-VCS, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *74–75 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 2009)
(“[T]he court should look to the entirety of the agreement in the context of the
parties’ relationship instead of isolating distinct provisions.”); Comrie v. Enterasys
Networks, Inc., 837 A.2d 1, 13 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“If the terms of the contract are
clear on their face, . . .  the court must apply the meaning that would be ascribed
to the language by a reasonable third party.” (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
58. See Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232
(Del. 1997) ([“[E]xtrinsic evidence may not be used to interpret the intent of the
parties, to vary the terms of the contract or to create an ambiguity.”); Gregory M.
Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the Interpretation of Contractual Incon-
sistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71, 99 (2009) (“The ‘four corners rule’ is that a court
should determine whether a contract is ambiguous from the ‘four corners’ of the
document, without considering extrinsic evidence.”); see also Michelle E. Board-
man, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1105, 1121–26 (2006) (arguing courts inappropriately inject ambiguity into con-
tracts that are unambiguous); cf. New Castle Cnty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Absent some ambiguity, Delaware courts will not
destroy or twist [ ] language under the guise of construing it, because creating an
ambiguity where none exists could . . . create a new contract with rights, liabilities
and duties to which the parties have not assented.”(internal quotation marks
omitted)).
59. See Stockman v. Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., No. 4427-VCS, 2009 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 131, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009).
60. See, e.g., Comrie, 837 A.2d at 13 (noting court may resort to extrinsic evi-
dence if language is not clear on its face).
61. Compare Wilmington Firefighters Ass’n, Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington,
No. 19035, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29, at *34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2002) (noting contra
proferentem “applies only where other secondary rules of interpretation have
failed”), with supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing mechanical na-
ture of “plain meaning” and “four corners” rules).
62. See 5-24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION Contra Proferentem—
Against the Party Who Chose the Contract Words § 24.27 (2014) (describing contra
proferentem as “doctrine of last resort”); id. (“If . . . the only remaining question is
which of two possible and reasonable meanings should be adopted, the court will
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 13 30-NOV-15 15:52
2015] CASEBRIEF 793
lactic in rationale; the rule encourages clear drafting and promotes fair-
ness to the non-drafting party who, in all likelihood, has not vigilantly read
the contract.63
To this end, contra proferentem is often applied to corporate instru-
ments under an estoppel theory.64  Employing the doctrine in this man-
ner addresses two primary concerns prevalent in Delaware jurisprudence:
(1) securing the reasonable expectations of individuals who must rely on
the instrument before joining the organization and (2) maintaining a pre-
dictable interpretive framework for Delaware litigants.65  Consider the jus-
tification for invoking the doctrine: to protect individuals with lesser
bargaining power, who take no part in drafting the instrument, who are
subjected to risk under the contract, but who are nevertheless bound by its
terms.66  This calculus is exacerbated when a corporate actor joins an or-
ganization, at least in part, based on the representations of its governing
often adopt the meaning that is less favorable in its legal effect to the party who
chose the words.”).  The “last resort” name refers to the fact that courts will apply
other canons of construction before contra proferentem. See id.
63. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION
AGAINST THE DRAFTSMAN § 206 (1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable mean-
ings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally pre-
ferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a
writing otherwise proceeds.”).  The Restatement goes on to provide rationale for
the contra proferentem rule:
Where one party chooses the terms of a contract, he is likely to pro-
vide more carefully for the protection of his own interests than for those
of the other party. He is also more likely than the other party to have
reason to know of uncertainties of meaning.  Indeed, he may leave mean-
ing deliberately obscure, intending to decide ata [sic] later date what
meaning to assert.  In cases of doubt, therefore, so long as other factors
are not decisive, there is substantial reason for preferring the meaning of
the other party.  The rule is often invoked in cases of standardized con-
tracts and in cases where the drafting party has the stronger bargaining
position . . . .
Id. at § 206 cmt. a; David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Stan-
dard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 437 (2009) (describing one explana-
tion for rule as “deter[ring] ambiguities” and another as “a ‘penalty default
rule’”); Posner, supra note 56, at 1608 (describing contra proferentem as “tiebreaker”
doctrine).
64. See, e.g., Stockman, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *16 (“The contra proferentem
approach protects the reasonable expectations of people who join a partnership or
other entity after it was formed and must rely on the face of the operating agree-
ment to understand their rights and obligations when making the decision to
join.”).
65. See id.; see also Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1150
(Del. 1997) (explaining contra proferentem resolves ambiguities in favor of reasona-
ble expectations of public investors). The reasonable expectations doctrine is a
related but distinct facet of contract interpretation. See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasona-
ble Expectations Revisited, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 111–14 (1998).  Of its multiple appli-
cations, the reasonable expectations doctrine is primarily used to determine the
meaning of contractual language and to protect parties from unconscionable in-
terpretations. See id.
66. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (providing rationale for
rule).
13
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documents.67  Thus, to level this imbalance, Delaware courts have applied
contra proferentem liberally to contract issues embedded in corporate
instruments.68
While Delaware’s contractual framework aims to effectuate consistent,
predictable, and stable litigation results, the Third Circuit has not been
particularly wedded to Delaware’s interpretive model.69  The Third Cir-
cuit’s approach, unlike the standard utilized in Delaware courts, reflects a
hybrid of traditional and modern interpretive norms.70  Whereas tradi-
tional contract construction is literalist, confined to the plain meaning
within the four corners of the contract and fosters predictable outcomes,
the modern approach introduces unpredictability by considering “a broad
inquiry into context and circumstances” surrounding the contract.71  Illus-
trating this point, the Third Circuit has been willing to find contract lan-
guage ambiguous under Delaware law simply because other jurisdictions
have interpreted the same terms as ambiguous.72  The upshot of this “am-
67. See Stockman, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *18 (“[W]here an entity’s gov-
erning instruments are involved, the onus is on the drafter to be clear.”).
68. See, e.g., Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del.
2013) (applying doctrine to limited partnership agreement); Stockman, 2009 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 131, at *19 n.21 (applying doctrine where bylaw was drafted by co-
founder seeking advancement); cf. DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, No. 1384-N,
2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at *25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006) (framing estoppel question
as whether plaintiff was  “within the class of persons who are generally covered by
the Operating Agreement’s advancement provisions[]”).
69. Compare, e.g., Stockman, 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *16 (“[I]t is critical
that the governing instruments of entities be interpreted consistently and that they
be applied in a predictable manner.”), with infra notes 70–73 and accompanying
text (discussing Third Circuit’s interpretive willingness to introduce broad inquiry
of surrounding circumstances). Cf. Thomas J. Rueter & Joshua H. Roberts, Penn-
sylvania’s Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: The Third Circuit’s Perspective, 45 VILL. L.
REV. 581, 583 (2000) (noting Third Circuit decisions have been inconsistent with
Pennsylvania contract doctrines).
70. See infra notes 71–73 and accompanying text (comparing Delaware’s tradi-
tional interpretive approach to Third Circuit’s hybrid approach).
71. See Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the De-
bate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 81–83 (1989) (ex-
plaining differences in modern interpretive approach and traditional interpretive
approach); id. at 135 (“The modern approach . . . constru[es] contract language to
fulfill the contracting parties’ expectations as determined through a broad inquiry
into all relevant considerations.”).
72. See New Castle Cnty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 756 (3d
Cir. 2001) (“A single phrase, which insurance companies have consistently refused
to define, and that has generated literally hundreds of lawsuits, with widely varying
results, cannot, under our application of commonsense, be termed unambigu-
ous.”); cf. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 1987) (“The
mere fact that several . . . courts have ruled in favor of a construction denying
coverage, and several others have reached directly contrary conclusions, viewing
almost identical policy provisions, itself creates the inescapable conclusion that the
provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” (alteration in
original) (quoting Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
14
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biguous by consensus” rationale is that Delaware precedent may not have a
significant effect on the Third Circuit’s own interpretative approach.73
D. Delaware’s Pro-Advancement Policies
A strictly contract-based reading of bylaws and advancement provi-
sions distracts from the broader policies and principles underlying
them.74  In situations where courts are forced to reconcile “hopelessly am-
biguous” terms, examining policy may be the only option for an equitable
resolution.75  Delaware has been forthright that the policies served by Sec-
tion 145 and any advancement provisions subsequently arising out of the
statute are implemented to attract and retain competent corporate offi-
cials.76  In upholding these policies, Delaware “eschew[s] narrow construc-
tion . . . where an overliteral reading would disserve [their purpose].”77
Additionally, given that advancement requires procedural urgency, Dela-
ware treats these issues with particular sensitivity and favors readings that
find advancement whenever possible.78
73. See Boardman, supra note 58, at 1121–26 (discussing courts that find
“[a]mbiguity by [c]onsensus”).
74. See Sun-Times Media Grp., Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 383 (Del. Ch.
2008) (noting inclusion of “practical and policy considerations” in addition to con-
sideration of explicit language in bylaws); see also Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow
Chem. Co., No. 3003-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, at *5–6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2008)
(“Although courts use the tools of contractual interpretation when construing by-
law provisions relating to indemnification and advancement, they simultaneously
apply the patina of section 145’s policy.”).
75. See Kaiser Aluminum Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. 1996)
(describing contract terms as “hopelessly ambiguous”).
76. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 218 (Del. 2005) (explaining
that advancement provisions “attract[ ] the most capable people into corporate
service”); VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (explaining
“dual policies” of Section 145 to, first, ensure corporate officials will be reimbursed
for litigation expenses “if vindicated” and to, second, attract “capable [individuals]
to serve as corporate directors and officers, secure in the knowledge that the cor-
poration will absorb the costs of defending their honesty and integrity”).
77. See VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 84; see also Sun-Times, 954 A.2d at 395 (“[T]he
[Advancement] Provision is to be interpreted broadly.”); Stifel Fin. Corp. v.
Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002) (“[T]he indemnification statute should be
broadly interpreted to further the goals it was enacted to achieve.”).
78. See DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, No. 1384-N, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 19, at
*23 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006) (“Delaware courts have read indemnification con-
tracts to provide coverage when that is reasonable.”); Delphi Easter Partners Ltd.
P’ship v. Spectacular Partners, Inc., No. 12409, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159, at *5–6
(Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 1993) (“In construing contractual language . . . conferring rights
of indemnification, courts should interpret language so as to achieve where possi-
ble the beneficial purposes that indemnification can afford.”).
15
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III. REJECTION FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT: A COUNTER-OFFER FOR
CONSTRUING ADVANCEMENT PROVISIONS IN ALEYNIKOV
Aleynikov was the Third Circuit’s first opportunity to rule on contra
proferentem in a corporate setting.79  The court’s holding will, in many ways,
render federal courts within the Third Circuit unattractive venues for cor-
porate governance issues moving forward, particularly if the issue involves
contract interpretation.80  Though even the dissenting judge in Aleynikov
agreed the term “officer” was ambiguous as a matter of law, ample case law
suggests that the term clearly includes vice presidents.81  Moreover, the
Third Circuit’s failure to apply contra proferentem in this context demon-
strates that the circuit court will not treat Delaware’s policy or precedent
deferentially.82
A. Facts and Procedure
Sergey Aleynikov served as a vice president at Goldman, Sachs & Co.
(GSCo), a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs Group (Goldman), from 2007 to
2009.83  During his tenure, Aleynikov created high-frequency trading
source code for Goldman’s trading department but did not have any man-
agerial or supervisory obligations.84  In April of 2009, Aleynikov resigned
from GSCo and accepted a position at a Chicago startup firm.85  During
the five-week period he remained at GSCo following his resignation,
Aleynikov allegedly stole thousands of lines of GSCo’s proprietary code.86
He was later charged and convicted for federal theft crimes.87  In August
of 2012, after the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
79. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 366 (3d Cir.
2014) (stating there is no direct precedent in Delaware case law addressing contra
proferentem in this context).
80. See infra notes 159–69 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 115–47 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text.
83. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 354 (“Aleynikov worked as a computer program-
mer for GSCo from May 7, 2007 until June 30, 2009, although his last day in the
office was June 5, 2009.  While at GSCo, he developed source code for Goldman’s
high-frequency trading system and held the title of vice president in GSCo’s equi-
ties division.”).  Goldman, Sachs & Co. is a “non-corporate subsidiary” of Goldman
Sachs Group. See id.
84. See id. (discussing Aleynikov’s job responsibilities).
85. See id. (detailing Aleynikov’s acceptance of job at Teza Technologies). See
generally United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining
Teza Technologies was “a Chicago-based startup that was looking to develop its
own HFT system”).
86. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 354 (stating Aleynikov stole source code on his
last day); id. (stating resignation date as April 2009 and last day as June 5, 2009).
87. See id. (“Aleynikov copied GSCo’s source code into computer files and
transferred those files to a server in Germany.”).  The encrypted files Aleynikov
stole included thousands of source code lines from Goldman’s high frequency
trading system, including algorithms that purportedly value stock options. See
Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74; see also Complaint, United States v. Aleynikov, 737 F.
Supp. 2d 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 10 cr. 96 (DLC)).
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reversed his federal conviction, Aleynikov was arrested again under New
York state law for crimes related to the same conduct.88
Following his re-arrest, Aleynikov filed a motion for summary judg-
ment in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
seeking indemnification for more than $2.3 million in costs incurred as a
result of his criminal proceedings.89
Aleynikov also claimed he was entitled to advancement under
Goldman’s bylaws.90  The bylaw provisions at issue were Sections 4.1 and
6.4.91  Section 4.1, in relevant part, authorizes Goldman’s board of direc-
88. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 355 (“On August 2, 2012, New York state authori-
ties arrested Aleynikov and charged him with state crimes based upon the same
alleged conduct.”).
89. See id. (“Aleynikov and his counsel sent a letter to Goldman seeking in-
demnification for over $2.3 million in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connec-
tion with the federal criminal proceedings and advancement of attorney’s fees and
costs related to the ongoing state criminal proceedings.”).  Aleynikov specifically
sought (1) reimbursement for the fees related to his successful defense in the fed-
eral criminal proceedings, (2) advancement for fees related to the ongoing state
criminal proceedings, and (3) advancement of fees related to the current Third
Circuit proceedings. See id. (“Aleynikov initiated this case . . . seeking indemnifica-
tion and advancement, as well as ‘fees on fees’ incurred in attempting to obtain
indemnification and advancement”).
90. See id. (noting Aleynikov’s counsel sent Goldman letter that “asserted [ ]
Aleynikov was entitled to indemnification and advancement under the By-Laws”);
see generally id. at 353 (referring to “By-Laws” as “GS Group’s By-Laws”).
91. See AMENDED AND RESTATED BY-LAWS OF THE GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC.
(as amended and restated as of May 22, 2013) [hereinafter GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS],
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/886982/000119312513237
445/d545345dex31.htm  [http://perma.cc/ERP6-LE7U] (restating Goldman’s by-
laws, § 4.1 of which gives Goldman’s board of directors authority to appoint
“officers”).
The Board of Directors shall take such action as may be necessary
from time to time to ensure that the Corporation has such officers as are
necessary . . . . In addition, the Board of Directors at any time and from
time to time may elect (i) one or more Chairmen of the Board and/or
one or more Vice Chairmen of the Board from among its members,
(ii) one or more Chief Executive Officers, one or more Presidents and/
or one or more Chief Operating Officers, (iii) one or more Vice Presidents,
one or more Treasurers and/or one or more Secretaries and/or (iv) one
or more other officers . . . .
Id. § 4.1 (emphasis added); see also id. § 6.4 (providing indemnification clause).
The Corporation shall indemnify to the full extent permitted by law
any person made or threatened to be made a party to any action, suit or
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative, by rea-
son of the fact that such person or such person’s testator or intestate is or
was a director or officer of the Corporation, is or was a director, officer,
trustee, member, stockholder, partner, incorporator or liquidator of a Subsidiary of
the Corporation . . . . Expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by any
such person in defending any such action, suit or proceeding shall be
paid or reimbursed by the Corporation promptly upon demand by such
person and, if any such demand is made in advance of the final disposi-
tion of any such action, suit or proceeding, promptly upon receipt by the
Corporation of an undertaking of such person to repay such expenses if
it shall ultimately be determined that such person is not entitled to be
17
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tors to “elect [such officers as necessary, including] . . . one or more Vice
Presidents . . . .”92  Section 6.4 provides a specific advancement provision
for officers of Goldman Sachs Group subsidiary companies and states, de-
fining, in relevant part, that
the term “officer,” . . . when used with respect to a Subsidiary . . .
shall refer to any person elected or appointed pursuant to the by-
laws of such Subsidiary or other enterprise or chosen in such
manner as is prescribed by the by-laws . . . [and] shall include in
addition to any officer of such entity, any person serving in a sim-
ilar capacity or as the manager of such entity.93
The district court granted Aleynikov’s motion with respect to his
claims for advancement and advancement-related fees, reasoning that a
“vice president” was an officer within the meaning of Goldman’s bylaws.94
Following summary judgment, Goldman filed an appeal disputing the dis-
trict court’s injunction ordering advancement of fees for Aleynikov’s
pending state criminal case.95
B. Narrative Analysis
The Third Circuit held that “officer” was ambiguous as a matter of law
and remanded the issue of whether extrinsic evidence “resolves the ambi-
guity to ascertain ‘which of the reasonable readings [of the term officer]
was intended by the parties.’”96  In reaching this holding, the court first
examined Goldman’s bylaws to determine whether the plain meaning of
the term could be construed unambiguously within the “four corners” of
indemnified by the Corporation.  The rights provided to any person by
this by-law shall be enforceable against the Corporation by such person,
who shall be presumed to have relied upon it in serving or continuing to serve
as a director or officer or in such other capacity as provided above.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS, supra note 91, § 4.1.
93. See id. § 6.4.
94. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 355 (“The District Court analyzed Section 6.4
[of] the By-Laws for ambiguity . . . . It proceeded to . . . conclud[e] that the evi-
dence submitted did not raise any genuine issues of material fact.”).  The district
court also determined that even if there were a genuine issue of material fact, the
doctrine of contra proferentem would apply, which would construe the unilaterally-
drafted contract against the drafter. See id.  Therefore, irrespective of any ambigu-
ity, Aleynikov’s advancement claim would be successful by default. See id.  The
district court denied summary judgment on the indemnification issue because the
actual monetary amount of Aleynikov’s legal fees for his federal case was in dis-
pute. See id.
95. See id. at 364–65 (detailing Goldman’s argument and trade usage evidence
that “vice presidents” are not “officers” within meaning of their bylaws).  Interest-
ingly, Goldman has indemnified or advanced the legal fees of fifteen vice presi-
dents in the six-year period prior to this proceeding. See id.
96. See id. at 367 (alteration in original) (quoting Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC
Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 309–10 (Del. Ch. 2002) (discussing what should be
done on remand).
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the document.97  Using these dual constructions, the court determined
that the definition of “officer” was “circuitous, repetitive, and, most impor-
tantly, ‘fairly or reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.’”98
The court therefore reasoned that extrinsic evidence was the only option
for resolving the ambiguity.99
The majority justified introducing extrinsic evidence into the record
because applying contra proferentem would have been, in their words, “inap-
propriate.”100  According to the majority, contra proferentem is employed to
resolve ambiguity concerning the scope of advancement rights, not to de-
termine whether an individual is entitled to the right to begin with.101
The court subsequently allowed Goldman to introduce “course of dealing”
and “trade usage” evidence to refute the district court’s holding that “of-
ficer” unambiguously includes “vice presidents.”102  The circuit court
found Goldman’s evidence that “[i]n the investment banking . . . in-
dustr[y], just about everyone is a vice president . . . .” and “[m]anagement
titles such as senior vice president . . . have spread so widely that, in many
cases being a vice president means nothing” particularly persuasive.103
Given the implications of this evidence, the court determined reasonable
minds could differ as to the meaning of “officer” in the bylaws, and there-
fore that summary judgment was improper.104  The majority ultimately
left the final determination of the evidence’s “interpretive value” up to the
jury.105
97. See id. at 359 (explaining bylaws are examined through regular contract
doctrine, including plain meaning); id. at 362 (explaining that resorting to extrin-
sic evidence in bylaw interpretation is problematic and rarely appropriate).
98. See id. at 362 (quoting Alta Berkeley VI C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381,
385 (Del. 2012)).
99. See id. (“When the provisions in controversy are [ambiguous] . . . . the
interpreting court must look beyond the language of the contract to ascertain the
parties’ intentions.” (quoting Eagle Indus., Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702
A.2d 1228, 1232 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
100. See id. (explaining why doctrine of contra proferentem was not applicable);
see also id. at 366–67 (rejecting contra proferentem).
101. See id. at 366–67 (distinguishing persons who were “a party to or in-
tended beneficiary of a corporate instrument” from those whose rights and obliga-
tions are in question).  The majority also explains, “we are left in a bind: most
extrinsic evidence should not be considered because Goldman unilaterally drafted
the By-Laws, yet we should not construe ambiguities against Goldman because we
are trying to determine if Aleynikov even is a party to the contract.” Id. at 362–63.
102. See id. at 363–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing details of
Goldman’s proffered evidence).
103. See id. at 364–65 (fourth and sixth alterations in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (discussing Goldman’s “trade usage” evidence that “vice
president” title is irrelevant in banking industry).
104. See id. at 368 (finding summary judgment “not appropriate for either
party at this time”).  The majority explained that the course of dealing and trade
usage evidence could “‘speak to the intent of all parties to [the] contract.’” Id. at
367 (quoting SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Charlebois, 707 A.2d 37, 43 (Del. 1998)).
105. See id. at 366 (“A jury must determine the interpretive value of
Goldman’s extrinsic evidence in resolving the ambiguity in the By-Laws.”).
19
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Judge Fuentes dissented in part.106  While he concurred that “officer”
was ambiguous within the meaning of Goldman’s bylaws, he would have
applied contra proferentem to resolve the issue.107  Judge Fuentes addition-
ally maintained that Delaware’s public policy surrounding advancement
would favor application of the doctrine in this instance, and that, by con-
trast, the majority’s decision rewards corporations for their sloppy draft-
ing.108  Finally, the dissent concluded that, notwithstanding the majority’s
failure to apply contra proferentem, the extrinsic evidence was improperly
admitted because it was subjective, self-serving, and provided no insight
into the meaning of the advancement provision.109
IV. FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT BREAKS ITS PROMISE
TO UPHOLD DELAWARE PRECEDENT AND POLICY
In Aleynikov, the Third Circuit faced the challenge of interpreting a
matter of Delaware’s substantive law.110  The opinion, therefore, should
have aligned with Delaware’s well-established corporate and contractual
jurisprudence.111  A macro and micro-level analysis of the circuit court’s
decision reveals a number of inconsistencies between the state and federal
interpretive rationales.112
A. The Straight and Narrow: A Deconstructed Reading of Aleynikov
Judicial interpretation of contracts, by definition, requires a particu-
larized investigation into the semantics and lexicography of the docu-
ment.113  Though the narrow reading here is confined to the language in
Goldman’s bylaws, juxtaposing the Third Circuit’s analysis with a would-be
106. See id. at 368–73 (Fuentes, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that court
should have applied contra proferentem doctrine).
107. See id. at 368 (“Delaware has never suggested that there is an exception
to its contra proferentem rule [in this circumstance].”); id. at 368–73 (providing fur-
ther rationale in favor of applying contra proferentem).
108. See id. at 370 (reasoning that majority’s ruling “incentivize[s]” corpora-
tions to keep ambiguous drafting).
109. See id. at 371–73 (admonishing majority for introducing extrinsic evi-
dence).  Judge Fuentes elaborated that, under Delaware law, extrinsic evidence is
used to determine an objectively reasonable understanding of the obligations of
the contract. See id. at 372.  By contrast, Goldman’s extrinsic evidence only speaks
to one party’s subjective belief about the meaning of the contract. See id.
110. See id. at 358 (majority opinion) (explaining opinion is constrained
under Delaware law); id. at 358 n.3 (“The parties agree that this case is governed
by Delaware law, as [Goldman Sachs Group] is a corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Delaware.”).
111. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding state
substantive law to govern diversity cases).
112. See infra notes 115–47 and accompanying text (providing micro level
analysis of Aleynikov decision); infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (provid-
ing macro level analysis of Aleynikov decision).
113. Cf. Duhl, supra note 58, at 84 (describing contract ambiguity as “seman-
tic or lexical”).
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Delaware approach delineates these differences in a useful manner for
practitioners facing similar issues.114
1. Plain Meaning
First, the “plain meaning” dictionary definition the court constructed
has been criticized as selective and shortsighted; the court examined only
the definition of “officer” but not the definition of “vice president.”115
This is especially concerning given the crux of the ambiguity issue was
whether the terms are interchangeable or inherently encompassed within
each other.116  The Third Circuit criticized the district court for focusing
on “vice president”—a term that did not appear in the ambiguous portion
of the bylaws—and instead concluded that only the ambiguity of “officer”
was worth examining.117
The fact that “officer” was not self-defining in the bylaws or elsewhere
was not problematic in and of itself, but the court also rejected a plain
meaning determination of the only other term at issue—“vice presi-
dent.”118  Therefore, under the court’s reading, any corporate employee
without “officer” explicitly denoted in their title would not be entitled to
advancement.119  This construction is inconsistent with Goldman’s previ-
ous “track record” of advancement for employees with non-“officer” titles,
which suggests that the court’s reading is flawed insofar as it retroactively
undermined a party’s previous understanding and enforcement of the ad-
vancement provision.120
114. See infra notes 115–58 and accompanying text (discussing narrow read-
ing of Aleynikov and broader implications for interpretative approaches between
Third Circuit and Delaware jurisdictions).
115. See Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 28–29, Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-4237) [hereinafter Brief for Appel-
lee], available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/cdn.orrick.com/files/aleynikov-brief-
goldman-sachs.pdf [http://perma.cc/82R8-H3Z2](criticizing limited plain mean-
ing inquiry of only “officer” and not “vice president” and explaining that “[t]he
taxonomical question answered by the court was whether a ‘vice president’ is a
species of ‘officer’ for the purposes of indemnification”).
116. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 359 (explaining Aleynikov’s claim for advance-
ment depends upon his “officer” status); id. at 354 (noting Aleynikov held title of
vice president).
117. See id. at 360. (explaining district court erred in analyzing “vice presi-
dent” because it “does not appear in the relevant portion of the contract”).  As
discussed further in infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text, the “relevant por-
tion of the contract” is a prejudicially limited reading under Delaware law.
118. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 360 (“[T]his apparent circuity—defining ‘of-
ficer’ as including any officer—is not problematic in and of itself.”)
119. See supra note 116.  It was uncontested that Aleynikov’s explicit title con-
tained no mention of “officer.” See id.  It was also uncontested that § 6.4 of
Goldman’s bylaws provided a circuitous definition of “officer.” See id. at 360–62.
Therefore, absent the dictionary definition of officer explicitly stating that the
term includes vice presidents, the Third Circuit’s reading ensured its finding of
ambiguity. See id.
120. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *39–46 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013) (detailing Goldman’s “track
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The Third Circuit’s analysis, therefore, jettisoned one major aspect of
a twofold inquiry that would have conclusively resolved the ambiguity: (1)
whether the relatively amorphous definition of “officer” includes “vice
presidents” and (2) whether “vice president,” by designation of the title
alone, intimates “officer.”121  Framing the issue this way, a would-be Dela-
ware approach using the plain meaning doctrine establishes that “officer”
is a broad, inclusive term that encompasses vice presidents.122  This is
manifest in both the dictionary definitions of each term and supporting
case law on the subject.123  Moreover, in previous “plain meaning” analy-
ses, Delaware courts have held that the title of “vice president” confers a
rebuttable presumption that the individual is an officer.124  In other
words, a broader construction in this instance would have clarified the
ambiguity, whereas the Third Circuit’s narrow reading precluded an im-
mediate resolution of the issue, absent extrinsic evidence.125
record of indemnification and advancement”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 765
F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).  In the six years preceding Aleynikov’s case, Goldman
indemnified or advanced fees for fifty-one employees, fifteen of whom were vice
presidents. See id. at *40.  Moreover, of the fifty-one employees, only three were
corporate officers as defined in Section 4.1 of Goldman’s bylaws. See id. at *43–44.
A remaining portion of those who were indemnified were titled “managing direc-
tor[s].” See id. at *44 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Goldman argued in
both the district court case and the Third Circuit case that its record of advance-
ment for vice presidents was purely discretional, and the courts ultimately dis-
agreed as to whether this evidence was relevant. See id. at *41–46; see also Aleynikov,
765 F.3d at 363–64.
121. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 115, at 29 (“Noting that the title ‘vice
president’ connotes ‘officer’ answered [whether a ‘vice president’ is a species of
‘officer’] as well as noting that ‘officer’ includes ‘vice presidents.’”).
122. See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
123. See Brakke v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:11-cv-00455-LMB, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 139973, at *8 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2012) (“The title ‘Regional Vice
President’ connotes an officer role to a normal observer.”); In re Foothills Tex.,
Inc., 408 B.R. 573, 583 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (“[A] person holding the title of an
officer, including a vice president, is presumptively what he or she appears to be—
an officer . . . .”); EMC Corp. v. Allen, No. 97-5972-B, 1997 Mass. Super. LEXIS
102, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1997) (“The plain meaning of [officer] in-
cludes an individual who holds a position as vice president.”); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3b-2 (1982) (“The term officer means a . . . vice president . . .  and any
person routinely performing corresponding functions with respect to any organi-
zation whether incorporated or unincorporated.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 1797(10th ed. 2014) (defining “vice president” as “[a] corporate officer of
mid-level to high rank”); WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2036
(2d ed. 1983) (defining “vice president,” in part, as “in some corporations, any of
several officer each in charge of a separate department”).
124. See In re Foothills, 408 B.R. at 574 (“The employees in this case are ‘vice
presidents.’  Under the plain meaning of the words, a vice president is an officer.
A person holding an officer’s title is presumptively an officer and, thus, an
insider.”).
125. Compare supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text (detailing Aleynikov
court’s limited plain meaning approach), with supra notes 121–24 and accompany-
ing text (detailing broader plain meaning approach).
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2. Four Corners
Second, even conceding, arguendo, that the plain meaning of “officer”
was ambiguous within Section 6.4, the court failed to correctly construe
the term within the four corners of the document.126  The court was only
able to find ambiguity based on a limited reading of the text that isolated
one sentence in the advancement provision from several other sentences
in the bylaws that explicitly define officer as “[including] . . . one or more
Vice Presidents . . . .”127  When ambiguity can be resolved by inter-textu-
ally defining the term, Delaware courts favor the more comprehensive
reading.128  By contrast, the Third Circuit interpreted one facially ambigu-
126. See infra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
127. See GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS, supra note 91, §§ 1.7, 4.1 (including vice presi-
dents within ambit of what is considered an officer).
 Irrespective of what is perhaps common knowledge in some corporate sec-
tors—that there is a clear difference between corporate Vice Presidents and non-
corporate, employee vice presidents—the court’s interpretive role is limited substan-
tially by the four corners of the document, and the document here does not distin-
guish between the two VP categories. Compare supra notes 115–25 and
accompanying text (discussing plain meaning doctrine), with infra notes 196–97
and accompanying text (providing statements supporting argument that vice presi-
dent title for banking employees is meaningless).  The natural reading of Sections
1.7 and 4.1 of Goldman’s bylaws, however, supports Aleynikov’s position.
GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS, supra note 91, §§ 1.7, 4.1.  Section 1.7 of the bylaws lists several
corporate positions, Vice President being one of them, and then immediately con-
trasts that list with the phrase, “or other officers.” See id. § 1.7.  The actual defini-
tion of officer in Section 4.1 follows a similar construction to Section 1.7. See id.
§ 4.1 (“[T]he Board . . . may elect . . . one or more Vice Presidents . . . or [ ] one or
more officers . . . .”).  The definition from Section 4.1 is incorporated in the in-
demnification provision under Section 6.4, which adds a further caveat when the
term is applied to Goldman’s subsidiaries: “[T]he term ‘officer’ shall include in
addition to any officer of such entity, any person serving in a similar capacity or as
the manager of such entity . . . .” See id. § 6.4.  Thus, while a more conservative
construction here may have produced an antithetical result for those well-versed
with banking industry terms and culture, that construction would not have been
internally inconsistent or ambiguous. See id.  The sentence immediately following
the imputation of the Section 4.1 definition of officer—including “one or more
Vice Presidents . . . .”—was allegedly the ambiguous source of confusion. See
Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2014).
128. See, e.g., Council of the Dorset Condo. Apts. v. Gordon, 801 A.2d 1, 7
(Del. 2002) (explaining courts must flexibly construe contractual provisions so as
to “reconcile[ ]” entire document when read as a whole); Smartmatic Int’l Corp. v.
Dominion Voting Sys. Int’l Corp., No. 7844-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, at *13
(Del. Ch. May 1, 2013) (“[I]f parties introduce conflicting interpretations of a
term, but one interpretation better comports with the remaining contents of the
document or gives effect to all the words in dispute, the court may . . . resolve the
meaning of the disputed term in favor of the superior interpretation.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Cencom Cable Income Partners, L.P. Litig., No.
14634, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 90, at *18 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2000) (“[T]he contract
should be read in its entirety and interpreted to reconcile all the provisions of the
agreement.”).
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ous sentence in one provision of the bylaws as fatal to the document’s
clarity.129
3. Delaware’s Advancement Policy
Third, the majority’s rejection of contra proferentem because “the doc-
trine [does not] appl[y] to determine whether a person has rights and
obligations under . . . a contract” is misguided.130  The court questioned
Aleynikov’s status as a party to Goldman’s bylaws based on dicta from an
unrelated case stating, “[t]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute
part of a binding broader contract among the directors, officer[s], and stock-
holders . . . .”131  While this language was a convenient excerpt to preclude
use of contra proferentem, it was inapposite to Aleynikov’s circumstance.132
The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that legally enforceable
bylaws, by default under the DCGL, authorize a corporation’s board of
directors to create a “broader contract” between the select few corporate
officials referenced in Aleynikov’s majority opinion.133  But the general de-
fault rule that initially gives shape to a corporation’s bylaws is also “by de-
sign, flexible and subject to change.”134  Goldman’s bylaws change the
default rule by expressly relating two separate provisions to employee obliga-
tions.135  This point is reinforced by a general understanding that “consti-
tutive documents . . . are meant to structure the affairs of everyone
associated with a business entity.”136  Thus, it is without question that
Goldman’s individual employees were parties to the broader bylaw con-
tract, and that applying contra proferentem would have been appropriate.137
129. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 359–62 (limiting analysis to Section 6.4 of by-
laws); id. at 362 (noting that although definition of “officer” was probably meant to
be axiomatic, plain meaning construction did not clarify ambiguity). Compare
Goldman’s Bylaws, supra note 91, §§ 1.7, 4.1 (including “vice presidents” as “of-
ficers”), with id. § 6.4 (providing circuitous definition of “officer”).
130. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 366; see also infra notes 148–58 and accompany-
ing text (discussing broader Delaware principles of application).
131. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 366–67 (emphasis added) (quoting Boilermak-
ers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
132. See infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text.
133. See Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939 (providing “binding broader contract”
language (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at n.7 (citing Airgas, Inc. v. Air
Products & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 2010)); Lawson v. Household
Fin. Corp., 152 A. 723, 726 (Del. 1930)).
134. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939.
135. See GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS, supra note 91, § 4.3 (authorizing board to re-
quire employee “to give security for the faithful performance of his or her duties”);
id. § 6.4 (authorizing board to provide indemnification to “any one or more of-
ficers, employees and other agents of any Subsidiary”) (emphasis added)).
136. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *64 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013), aff’d in part and vacated in part,
765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
137. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
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4. Mitigating and Equitable Circumstances
Meanwhile, the fee-producing litigation underlying the Third Circuit
case also supports the conclusion that Aleynikov was in fact a party to the
bylaws.138  Aleynikov’s criminal charges were brought “by reason of fact”
that he was able to steal software that was so powerful it “could manipulate
the market in unfair ways.”139  It was uncontested that Aleynikov’s position
at GSCo afforded him the privilege and authority to access this exceed-
ingly confidential information.140  This point was overlooked (or not
raised) in the Third Circuit case, which focused only on Goldman’s extrin-
sic evidence.141  The Third Circuit’s furnished definition of “officer”—
“someone holding a position of trust, authority, or command”—seems to
inconspicuously describe the functional aspects of Aleynikov’s position.142
Even peripheral knowledge of the suit underlying Aleynikov’s advance-
ment claim would compel a common sense understanding that he was an
officer within the meaning of bylaws.143
The combined effect of this piecemeal deconstruction informs a
broader discussion of the interpretive differences between Delaware and
Third Circuit courts.144  All things considered, the Third Circuit’s con-
structive alternative in Aleynikov was too strict to effectuate an equitable
holding.145  Time will be the ultimate determinant as to whether Aleynikov
is an outlier or part of a growing trend in the Third Circuit’s corporate
and contractual jurisprudence.146  Regardless, the decision is an incre-
138. See infra notes 139–142.
139. See JIM MCTAGUE, CRAPSHOOT INVESTING: HOW TECH-SAVVY TRADERS AND
CLUELESS REGULATORS TURNED THE STOCK MARKET INTO A CASINO 40 (2011) (quot-
ing U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponte, prosecutor for Aleynikov’s criminal trial in
Southern District of New York) (internal quotation marks omitted). See generally
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (stating indemnification shall be paid “by reason of
the fact” individual was officer of corporation); United States v. Aleynikov, 676
F.3d 71, 73–75 (2d Cir. 2012) (providing specific background and details of
Aleynikov’s position and charges).
140. See Aleynikov, 676 F.3d at 74 (noting Aleynikov had access to closely
guarded high frequency trading system); see also id. (noting Aleynikov was highest
paid programmer in his group).
141. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 362–65 (detailing Goldman’s extrinsic
evidence).
142. See id. at 360–61.
143. See Douglas v. Tractmanager, Inc., No. 9073-ML, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS
94, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2014) (inferring “[p]laintiffs’ unique position as of-
ficers allowed them to engage in the alleged wrongdoing” and therefore holding
that advancement was enforceable).
144. See infra notes 148–58 and accompanying text (framing broader interpre-
tive approaches).
145. See Aleynikov, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *59 (explaining procedu-
ral delays on advancement issues leave parties without remedy and it is “not
[within] the letter or spirit of the Delaware statute . . . to take the easy option of
simply denying the motion . . . .”); supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing same).
146. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (discussing Third Circuit’s
relationship to Delaware’s precedential interpretive norms); see infra notes 148–58
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mental showing that the jurisdictional approaches to contract interpreta-
tion and their respective attitudes towards corporate law splinter on key
points.147
B. On to the Broad Strokes: Examining Variant Interpretive Approaches
Between the Third Circuit and Delaware Courts
Aleynikov’s majority opinion most notably departs from Delaware in-
terpretive framework in its rejection of the contra proferentem doctrine.148
Though the opinion was a matter of first impression, the summation of
Delaware precedent contradicts the “narrow construction” and “overliteral
reading” exhibited by the circuit court’s majority that ultimately precluded
use of the doctrine.149  The Aleynikov majority focused narrowly on the fact
that, even with its well-established contractual and corporate case law, Del-
aware has never applied contra proferentem against an individual whose “of-
ficer” status was in question.150  Unwilling to read the doctrine liberally,
the circuit court admitted extrinsic evidence and its subsequent analysis
aligned more closely with the “broad inquiry into . . . surrounding circum-
stances” exhibited in the modern contractual approach.151
Delaware’s interpretive rationale, by contrast, is much more forward-
looking and can be articulated as a “means-to-an-end” approach—the end
being consistent, predictable results in its corporate and contractual juris-
prudence.152  Delaware courts have not been concerned with making a
and accompanying text (situating Third Circuit approach in Aleynikov to Delaware
principles of construction).
147. Compare infra notes 148–51 and accompanying text (discussing Third Cir-
cuit reading), with infra notes 152–58 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware
interpretive rationale).
148. Compare supra notes 59–68 and accompanying text (discussing applica-
tions of contra proferentem under Delaware law), with supra notes 100–01 and accom-
panying text (detailing Third Circuit reasoning for rejecting doctrine).
149. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 366 (3d Cir.
2014) (noting that court has not found case law addressing contra proferentem to
construe ambiguity against non-drafting individuals whose benefit to contract was
in question); see also VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998)
(asserting Delaware prohibits narrow constructions and overliteral readings of ad-
vancement provisions); supra notes 59–78 and accompanying text (discussing lib-
eral applications of contra proferentem and flexible interpretations of advancement
provisions).
150. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 366 (stating it would be inappropriate to apply
contra proferentem).
151. See Tauke, supra note 71, at 78. Compare Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 363 (ad-
mitting evidence “to shed light on how reasonable individuals in the investment
banking industry and at GSCo specifically would have interpreted the term of-
ficer”), with supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing modern contractual
approach).
152. See, e.g., Stockman v. Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., No. 4227-VCS,
2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *16 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009) (declaring predictable
and consistent interpretations to be critical “as a practical matter”).
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case’s novel factual circumstance fit cleanly within precedent.153  Instead,
Delaware focuses on maintaining a stable and efficient framework for judi-
cial interpretation; “one size fits all” rules like contra proferentem are there-
fore embraced under Delaware law—within reason.154
Situating these fundamental aspects of Delaware’s interpretive model
in Aleynikov, it is axiomatic that Delaware courts would have applied the
contra proferentem rule as a means to an end.155  The Aleynikov dissent
touched on this point, noting that use of the doctrine would encourage
consistent and predictable judicial interpretations.156  The underlying
“triggers” for invoking the doctrine—disparate bargaining power, unilat-
eral drafting, “reliance interest,” and subjected risk/benefit—also support
the dissent’s reading of Delaware’s interpretive approach.157  In sum, the
Aleynikov majority’s narrow reading of the contra proferentem doctrine is in-
consistent with the principles underlying the rule as well as Delaware pre-
cedent that uses the doctrine as a “mechanistic device” in circumstances
where its utility would be the means to the “ends” of efficiency, predictabil-
ity, and consistency.158
C. A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum: Forum Shopping in
Light of Aleynikov
Implicit in the Aleynikov decision is the larger issue of forum-shop-
ping.159  Given the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the substantive state
153. See id. at *19 n.21 (applying contra proferentem even though claimant “was
probably involved in drafting . . . . [because] [d]oing otherwise [would] risk[ ] the
bizarre outcome of concluding that the same language . . . means different things
as applied to two persons . . . .”).
154. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *60 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013) (explaining Delaware law is toler-
ant of ambiguity and will remedy by contra proferentem).
155. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 369 (Fuentes, J., dissenting in part) (asserting
Delaware would apply doctrine to “(1) assure relevant stakeholders that they could
reasonably rely on the face of governing documents of Delaware corporations, and
(2) encourage Goldman to redraft the advancement provision in its By-Laws.”).
156. See id. at 370 (explaining application of contra proferentem encourages
clear drafting and predictable results).
157. Compare id., with supra notes 59–67 and accompanying text (discussing
justifications for invoking contra proferentem).
158. See Wilmington Firefighters Ass’n, Local 1590 v. City of Wilmington, No.
19035, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 29, at *34 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2002) (coining term
“mechanistic device”); supra notes 113–58 and accompanying text (highlighting
inconsistencies between Delaware and Third Circuit interpretive approaches).
159. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shop-
ping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L.
REV. 11, 14 (1991) (“‘Forum shopping’ is commonly defined as attempting to have
one’s case heard in the forum where it has the greatest chance of success.”);
Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50
U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 268 (1996) (“Forum-shopping ‘occurs when a party attempts
to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will
receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.’” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY 655 (6th ed. 1990))).  Aleynikov’s case is paradigmatic of the forum-shopping
27
Meleca: An "Officer" and a G[old]man: The Third Circuit Finds Ambiguous C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 28 30-NOV-15 15:52
808 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 781
law at issue in Aleynikov, litigants seeking advancement relief or arguing
under contract theory will be dissuaded from finding remedy in any fed-
eral court under the circuit court’s binding authority.160  Beyond the gen-
eral consensus that forum-shopping is an unfair manipulation of the
judicial process, it also has harmful effects on the integrity of the supervi-
sory structure of the appellate courts.161  When corporate litigants flock to
Delaware to receive a specific outcome, other courts hear less corporate
cases and their stake in corporate jurisprudence becomes less relevant and
less credible.162  But the efficacy of the appellate system depends on vari-
concern; he filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery on February 10, 2015,
seeking advancement once again from Goldman Sachs. See Jonathan Stempel,
Goldman Ex-Programmer Files New Lawsuit to Recoup Legal Fees, REUTERS (Feb. 10,
2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/10/goldman-aleynikov-idUSL
1N0VK2IV20150210 [http://perma.cc/DH8D-U8VZ] (“The case is Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., Delaware Chancery Court, No. 10636.”).  Also indica-
tive that the Third Circuit’s decision will lead to forum shopping was Goldman’s
immediate removal of the case to the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware and its subsequent motion to transfer to the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey, which, unlike the Delaware Court of Chan-
cery, would be bound by the Third Circuit’s decision. See Notice of Removal,
Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 1:15-cv-00148 (D. Del. Feb. 10, 2015); see
also Defendant’s Motion to Transfer, Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 1:15-
cv-00148 (D. Del. Feb. 12, 2015).  The case was transferred to the District of New
Jersey on March 23, 2015. See Certified Copy of Transfer Order and docket re-
ceived, Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2:15-cv-02057-KM-MAH (D.N.J.
March 23, 2015).  At the time this Casebrief went to print, the last major disposi-
tion of the case was Aleynikov’s motion to remand the proceeding back to state
court. See Letters Regarding Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion to Remand, Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2:15-cv-02057-KM-MAH (D.N.J. Aug. 26–Sept. 28,
2015).
160. See supra notes 52–73 and accompanying text (juxtaposing Third Circuit
and Delaware contract construction).  Delaware has already been the target of fo-
rum-shopping for breach of fiduciary duty defensive declaratory injunctions and
for corporate bankruptcy actions. See Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker,
Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation: Who Caused This Problem, and Can it Be Fixed?, 37 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2012) (discussing origins of non-Delaware forum-shopping for
breach of fiduciary duty claims because these claims that “might otherwise be dis-
missed by the Delaware courts may gain traction in a non-Delaware forum”); id. at
14–27 (discussing defense mechanisms to keep Delaware courts adjudicating
breach of fiduciary duty issues); Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting
America’s Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1157–80 (2006) (reviewing LYNN M.
LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING THE
BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005)) (discussing forum-shopping in Delaware in bank-
ruptcy context).
161. Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 25, 25–28 (2005) (reviewing case law and scholarship and submitting that
“forum shopping is the taking of an unfair advantage of a party in litigation”); see
also infra notes 159–64 and accompanying text (discussing forum-shopping as det-
rimental to inter-jurisdictional competition).
162. See Samir D. Parikh, Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy, 46 CONN. L.
REV. 159, 197 (2013) (noting Delaware bankruptcy courts that have been targeted
by forum shopping are among the courts that are “making [the] law”).
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ance and competition among multiple jurisdictions.163  Without the “com-
petition” of other courts’ voices, Delaware law becomes a monopoly.164
Thus, when the Third Circuit is challenged with interpreting Dela-
ware law, its role in corporate governance assumes even greater impor-
tance.165  The balance here is delicate.166  On one hand, non-Delaware
courts cannot and should not blindly defer to Delaware for all corporate
matters.167  On the other hand, if non-Delaware courts treat issues arising
under Delaware law erroneously, they lose credibility as nonpartisan fo-
rums and compromise future opportunities to legitimately challenge Dela-
ware’s grip on corporate law.168  The Third Circuit’s significant departure
from Delaware precedent and policy in Aleynikov will therefore potentially
have devastating effects on the jurisdiction’s stake in corporate law, both
as a competing venue to Delaware and as a reputable (and predictable)
proxy for interpreting Delaware law generally.169
V. CONTRACTING AROUND ALEYNIKOV: PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CORPORATE PRACTITIONERS
Ambiguous contracts generate an enormous amount of time and ex-
pense for both corporations and their constituents.170  Practitioners
should therefore thoroughly draft and review governing instruments, es-
163. See id. at 198 (discussing harmful effects of forum-shopping).
A cornerstone of our judicial system is that the law be subject to a variety
of interpretations at the trial level.  Significant disagreement at the trial
level will often prompt circuit court review, and disagreement at the cir-
cuit court level will often prompt Supreme Court review.  But when a few
judges, by virtue of sitting in desirable venues, are the only judges to re-
view certain issues, the system breaks down.  Without discourse, the re-
view process ceases.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see LoPucki &
Whitford, supra note 159, at 58 arguing forum shopping is beneficial for
competition).
164. See Parikh, supra note 162, at 198 (explaining that “[w]ithout dis-
course . . . inaccuracies remain unchallenged and are actually strengthened by
repeated application to a long string of cases”).
165. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text; see also Monica E. White,
Note, Give Me a Break-Up Fee: In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP and the Third
Circuit’s Improper Rejection of Bankrupcy Bid Protection, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 671 n.76
(2011).
166. See also White, supra note 165, at 671 n.76 (explaining that “because Del-
aware wields disproportionate influence in corporate and bankruptcy law” Third
Circuit influence in bankruptcy especially “assumes greater importance”); see also
supra notes 152–58 and accompanying text.
167. See Parikh, supra note 162 (positing unchallenged inaccuracies foster
strength of inaccuracies under Delaware law).
168. See id. at 198 (“Forum shoppers are voicing their approval of certain
courts’ interpretation[s] . . . [and] their disapproval of how other courts have in-
terpreted the same issues.”)
169. See supra notes 153–62 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 14 and 36 (detailing litigation expenses for advancement
suits).
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pecially if the organization’s structure is multifaceted.171  As a proactive
measure, corporations and their employees may benefit from investing in
Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance policies.172  Finally, in
the event a bylaw dispute reaches litigation, counsel must be cognizant of
the difference between the Third Circuit’s and Delaware’s interpretive ap-
proaches and guide their client’s choice of venue accordingly.173
A. Transactional Practitioners
The ambiguity issue raised in Aleynikov is avoidable.174  Transactional
practitioners should review ambiguous bylaws and be proactive to ensure
that their client’s governing instruments do not leave room for unac-
counted interpretation.175  These documents should explicitly state which
employee titles receive which benefits and should not use vague, catchall
terms that are not self-defining.176
Depending on the structure of the organization, the proactive steps
necessary to ensure constructive clarity may vary.177  Part of the ambiguity
in Aleynikov was caused by the fact that Goldman did not have a separate
and independent advancement provision for its subsidiary companies.178
This fact became problematic because, as Goldman argued, the industry
understanding of “officer” and “vice president” varies based on the size
and structure of the organization.179  Therefore, for organizations com-
prised of several entities, maintaining separate advancement provisions
171. See infra notes 174–80 and accompanying text (discussing various consid-
erations for clear drafting depending on organizational structure of business).
172. See infra notes 181–84 and accompanying text (providing information on
D&O insurance policies).
173. See supra notes 113–69 and accompanying text (comparing interpretive
approaches between Third Circuit and Delaware courts); see also infra notes 185–92
(providing procedural considerations for filing at state and federal levels).
174. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 1 (“The bylaws of JPMorgan Chase, Bank
of America and Morgan Stanley, by contrast, are unambiguous on whose legal fees
will be covered.”).
175. See generally Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir.
2014) (examining ambiguous bylaw as source of litigation), en banc reh’g denied,
summary judgment denied, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5296 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2015).
176. See Michael Stoner, When Is a Vice-President a Corporate Officer for Indemnifi-
cation and Insurance Purposes?, PROP. CASUALTY 360 (Nov. 24, 2014), http://
www.propertycasualty360.com/2014/11/24/when-is-a-vice-president-a-corporate-
officer-for-i?page_all=1 [http://perma.cc/HZ8X-ACZF] (advising corporations fol-
lowing Aleynikov to “review[ ] their bylaws to ensure that their definition of officer
is clear and unambiguous . . . [and] ensur[e] that the scope of the term ‘officer’
meets the company’s goals as it relates to advancement, indemnity, and
insurance”).
177. See infra note 180 (discussing how complex structures change proactive
measures for drafting clearly).
178. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 354 (explaining Section 6.4 of Goldman’s by-
laws address advancement for corporate and non-corporate subsidiaries). See gener-
ally GOLDMAN’S BYLAWS, supra note 91, § 6.4 (providing advancement provision).
179. See Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 361, 363 (arguing Goldman corporation and its
non-corporate subsidiaries had varying appointment procedures for officers).
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will safeguard parent corporations from inadvertently transposing titles
and terminology onto their subsidiaries.180
Careful drafting and transparent communication between a corpora-
tion and its employees will not eliminate every situation that triggers the
right to advancement.181  D&O insurance policies offer a flexible scope of
protection for both corporations and their employees when these unavoid-
able situations arise.182  D&O policies tend to apply to a broader range of
individuals and cover expenses for a broader scope of litigation than is
typically required by Section 145.183  Practitioners should be well-versed in
the coverage offered by various types of insurance policies and advise their
clients accordingly.184
B. Litigation Practitioners
Aleynikov indicates that, for corporate claimants choosing between
state and federal venues, forum-shopping will ultimately be outcome de-
terminative for contract-based claims.185  Thus, before initiating suit, cor-
porate counselors should advocate to have their case heard in the venue
that applies Delaware’s substantive law most favorably to their client’s cir-
cumstance.186  For parties seeking an exacting contractual standard that
does not weigh heavily on Delaware’s pro-management policies, file “verti-
180. See David L. Cox & Clay C. Wheeler, Indemnification, Advancement, and
Insurance Coverage: Food for Thought When an Employee Is Charged with a Crime, LEGAL




Original [http://perma.cc/BX8C-NGCL] (advising against complex business
structures adopting “Goldman’s ‘one size fits all’ approach”); Kevin LaCroix, Who
Is an “Officer”? A Critical Inquiry for Indemnification and Insurance, D&O DIARY (Sept.
17, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/09/articles/corporate-governance/
who-is-an-officer-a-critical-inquiry-for-indemnification-and-insurance/ [http://
perma.cc/L9PQ-AYW8] (advocating for “separate operating units to have separate
indemnification provisions”).
181. Cf., e.g., Perconti v. Thornton Oil Corp., No. 18630-NC, 2002 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 51, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002) (summarizing corporation’s argument
that corporate official was not entitled to indemnification, not because of ambigu-
ous bylaws, but rather because his conduct was “motivated by personal self-interest
and greed”).
182. See infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text.
183. See Cox & Wheeler, supra note 180, at 2 (“D&O policies may provide
broader coverage than the company’s indemnification obligations”); LaCroix,
supra note 180 (explaining D&O policies broadly include employees); see also
Stoner, supra note 176 (explaining “Side-B coverage under D&O policies” apply to
corporate employees in addition to corporate officers and directors).
184. See generally Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: In-
surance and Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775 (1987) (providing history and
pertinent information on D&O policies).
185. See supra notes 118–58 and accompanying text (analyzing variant narrow
and broad interpretive approaches to contra proferentem).
186. See infra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
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cally” at the federal level.187  For parties seeking deference to pro-manage-
ment policy and flexible contract interpretation effectuating this goal, file
“horizontally” in Delaware.188
Once claimants have been advised on the most hospitable venue for
filing, practitioners should take note of the procedural advantages and
disadvantages at both the state and federal levels and should structure
pleadings accordingly.189  Delaware, for example, is a notice-pleading ju-
risdiction and therefore has a more lenient standard for surviving a
12(b)(6) motion.190  Moreover, state-level litigation has the advantage of
the Court of Chancery’s procedural tools that effectuate timely invocation
of advancement remedies.191  The state’s summary procedure—compared
to the limited federal options of summary judgment or jury trial—is an
efficient mode of dispute resolution for issues, like advancement, that are
provisional in nature and require immediate relief.192
187. See generally Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and
Delaware’s Stake in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 60 (2009) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted) (describing federal system as “vertical” to Delaware (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
188. See generally id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing state
courts as “horizontal” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
189. See infra notes 190–92 and accompanying text (comparing procedural
differences between Delaware and federal courts).
190. Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (providing heightened pleading standard for federal
filings pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)), and In re Moll Indus. Inc., 454 B.R.
574, 581 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (articulating heightened federal pleading
standard).
A claim is sufficient if it is facially plausible, that is “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Determin-
ing whether a complaint is “facially plausible” is “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense.”  “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted), with Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan
Stanley Mortg. Capital Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011) (articulating
Delaware’s pleading standard).
When reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we (1) accept all
well pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations
as “well pleaded” if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3)
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and (4)
do not affirm a dismissal unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to
recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.
Id. (emphasis added).
191. See infra note 192.
192. See Confederate Motors, Inc. v. Terny, 859 F. Supp. 2d 181, 188 (D. Mass.
2012) (explaining summary advancement proceedings under Delaware law).
Under Delaware law, [a]n advancement action is a summary pro-
ceeding.  Unlike proceedings to determine the right to receive final in-
demnification, the scope of an advancement proceeding is limited to
determining the issue of entitlement according to the corporation’s ad-
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [2016], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss4/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-4\VLR405.txt unknown Seq: 33 30-NOV-15 15:52
2015] CASEBRIEF 813
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit’s Aleynikov decision is a culmination of the court’s
reading of a non-linear set of issues manifest in Delaware law.193  To this
end, the opinion is not as much a betrayal of stare decisis as it is a defini-
tive statement that Delaware law will not be treated with Delaware’s corpo-
rate-friendly gloss in this federal jurisdiction.194  While variant approaches
to corporate law are vital to the efficacy of the appellate process, non-
Delaware courts should pick their battles conservatively or risk losing com-
petitive credibility altogether.195  Contravening Delaware’s traditional ap-
plication of contra proferentem, the Aleynikov majority opened the door to a
flood of evidence suggesting, as Goldman argued, “vice president” is a
meaningless denotation in the banking sector.196  And that may very well
be true.197  But at the end of the day, who should bear the cost of sloppy
vancement provisions and not to issues regarding the movant’s alleged
conduct in the underlying litigation.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp.,
884 A.2d 500, 509 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
also Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 12-5994 (KM-MAH), 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5296, at *6 n.4 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2015) (“[T]he federal court options
may be limited to summary judgment or trial—procedural tools not designed with
state provisional remedies specifically in mind.”). See generally Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *27 (D.N.J. Oct. 22,
2013) (explaining “emergent and provisional nature of the advancement rem-
edy”), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
193. See supra notes 46–78 and accompanying text (providing background of
various frameworks governing ambiguous contract disputes under advancement
provisions).
194. See supra notes 110–58 and accompanying text (comparing Delaware and
Third Circuit approaches to corporate governance and contract interpretation);
see also Jill E. Fisch, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Business Organizations: The Pecu-
liar Role of Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV.
1061, 1071 (2000) (explaining that because “Delaware’s corporate law rules are
standards based, Delaware precedents are narrow and fact-specific . . . Delaware
courts employ weak principles of stare decisis leading to extensive doctrinal flux.”).
195. See supra notes 159–69 and accompanying text (discussing forum-
shopping).
196. See Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 A.3d 350, 363–66 (3d Cir.
2014) (detailing extrinsic evidence on title inflation).
197. See, e.g., id. at 354 (noting one third of GSCo’s tens of thousands of em-
ployees are vice presidents); Chief Receptionist Officer? Title Inflation Hits C-Suite,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 30, 2007), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/
article/chief-receptionist-officer-title-inflation-hits-the-c-suite/ [http://perma.cc/
MRL6-XULK] (“[I]n the investment banking and brokerage industries, just about
everyone is a vice president, including ‘the guys opening the door and serving you
coffee.’” (quoting Peter Cappelli, Director of Wharton’s Center for Human Re-
sources)); Stuart Silverstein, Title Inflation—Standard Fare in Banking, Hollywood—Is
Now in Corporate America, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 1998, http://articles.latimes.com/
1998/may/31/business/fi-55115 [http://perma.cc/YX5E-5GG8] (“[M]an-
agement titles such as senior vice president, executive vice president and senior
executive vice president have spread so widely that ‘in many cases being a vice
president means nothing.’” (quoting Paul Baard, Assoc. Professor of Commc’ns &
Mgmt. at Fordham Univ.)).
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drafting and an industry-wide title inflation ruse?198  All things consid-
ered, the Third Circuit’s answer to this question may have prematurely
challenged Delaware law on an issue Delaware courts ultimately would
have gotten right.199
198. See supra notes 2–20 and accompanying text (discussing corporate ac-
countability in Post-Enron world).
199. See supra notes 113–58 and accompanying text (discussing Delaware ap-
proach to Aleynikov); see also supra notes 159–69 and accompanying text (discussing
forum shopping’s impediment on appellate process).
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